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  Overview 
Research on the impact and effectiveness of transparency and accountability initiatives (TAIs) 
targeted at the extractives sector is hard to come by. With the exception of some more 
systematic evaluation of the impact of multi-stakeholder initiatives, in particular the Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), the existing evidence is weak. Indeed, beyond the EITI-
focussed literature, the emphasis tends to be on the perceived challenges and risks associated 
with TAIs, accompanied by some anecdotal evidence of purported success. There is also some 
discussion of the factors which are considered to be conducive to such success.  
Given these gaps in the existing literature, this helpdesk report firstly looks at the strength of the 
evidence base generally, with some discussion of the inherent challenges of measuring impact in 
the field. It then goes on to present the limited evidence of impact and effectiveness of initiatives 
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involving a range of different actors. In doing so it adopts a broad definition of TAIs which 
includes both supply and demand side interventions which are considered to play a role in 
supporting accountable natural resource governance. Finally, the report provides a selection of 
potential areas for future research which have been suggested by various commentators. It 
should also be noted that, because of the international attention it receives and the treatment it is 
afforded in the literature, EITI features prominently in this helpdesk report. 
Key findings 
Whilst there is some consensus on what good natural resource governance looks like, there 
remains little understanding of the factors that contribute to positive outcomes. Instead, most 
TAIs in the extractives sector are based on the assumption that making information about 
revenue flows more transparent enables citizens, governments and other stakeholders to use the 
information to hold government to account.  As a result, “impact” tends to be measured in terms 
of compliance with standards or changes in procedures at the organizational or institutional level, 
rather than broader development or governance outcomes.  
Yet, while there is some evidence that TAIs in the extractives sector (in particular the EITI) can 
contribute to greater transparency, the question of whether this leads to more accountability, or 
to broader governance, social and development outcomes remains largely unanswered. Indeed, 
unpacking the assumptions behind this causal chain is increasingly recognised as critical for 
understanding the impact of TAIs more generally. Moving forward, it is therefore considered 
critical to make a clearer distinction between short term outcomes (transparency), intermediate 
outcomes (e.g. participation and accountability), and long term outcomes (social and 
developmental gains). More also needs to be done to understand how contextual factors affect 
the interaction between these different outcomes. 
Multi-stakeholder initiatives and civil society coalitions 
The available evidence suggests that EITI has been most successful in reaching its institutional 
goals and consolidating transparency as a global norm, and somewhat successful in reaching 
some of the operational goals, such as greater revenue transparency and civil society 
involvement in multi-stakeholder groups. However, the impact of EITI on broader governance, 
development and social goals remains unclear. Moreover, the evidence suggests that greater 
disclosure has yet to lead to tangible accountability reforms or improved efficiency in the 
distribution of national resources. Other important shortcoming of EITI identified in the literature 
include: the absence of key countries, the lack of attention to scale, limited sanctioning power 
especially for companies, the loss of momentum of EITI processes beyond the validation stage, 
and the risk of unintended consequences. 
In the case of another important coalition, the Publish What You Pay (PWYP) campaign, the 
evidence suggests that where national coalitions have made significant progress in their 
transparency campaigns, this has been due to the adoption of a combination of strategies 
including: taking advantage of windows of opportunity and tipping points, grassroots organisation 
and public action, building coalitions among policy actors, and, to a lesser extent, through 
targeted messaging.  
A key challenge for the success of such initiatives is the limited space for civil society to 
participate in public governance in many countries. In the case of EITI, there are also concerns 
surrounding stakeholder group selection processes and unclear or inadequate roles and 
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responsibilities of CSOs. Furthermore, the relevance of multi-stakeholder activities and outputs to 
existing civil society priorities has been brought into question, as has the ability of CSOs to 
adequately comprehend and disseminate the information being disclosed.  
Media and investigative journalism 
The evidence of the impact of investigative journalism on extractive industry governance is 
particularly thin. While efforts to train journalists around extractive industry reporting can have 
some impact on the quality and quantity of extractives related reporting, this does not always 
“trickle up” to media outlets more broadly. Media impact is also increasingly being recognised in 
terms of the increasing efforts to make sense of the ever-growing volume of data being produced 
on extractive industries as well as through mutual “amplification” of social media and traditional 
media sources. Such impact is considered more likely when there are other pressures present at 
the same time, including political transitions, internal political conflicts and external pressure.  
Key obstacles to effective investigative journalism around the extractives sector are considered 
to include poor pay, limited access to information from both government and business sources, 
direct and indirect forms of pressure from government or business, bribery of journalists, lack of 
technology, and lack of skills. Further significant challenges include the complexity of reporting 
on a sector such as the extractive industries, the asymmetry of information between powerful 
actors and the media, the often incomplete and inconsistent nature of released data, and the use 
of technology by opposing forces to monitor and silence critical voices in the media. 
Legislatures and audit institutions 
The potential contribution and impact on extractives governance of horizontal accountability 
mechanisms, in particular the role of elected legislators, has received very little attention in the 
literature. This is despite the fact that legislators can support the governance of extractive 
industries in a number of ways, including by: ensuring public disclosure of extraction contracts, 
monitoring compliance with contracts and laws; amending and ratifying legislation, scrutinizing 
revenue projections, monitoring the performance of government agencies, building consensus 
within and across political parties on extractives governance, and managing expectations of 
constituents. Extractive industry committees are seen as a particularly effective way for 
legislators to organize and coordinate their involvement. 
However, effective oversight and rule-making is often hampered by a range of contextual factors, 
including conflicting motivations of legislators, political and legal constraints, and institutional-
structural constraints. This is often compounded by reluctance of powerful executive branches 
and other political actors to share information with parliaments, the culture of secrecy over 
extractive industry activities which leads to limited legislative access to information, limited 
resources, and, in some cases the perception held by many legislators themselves that the 
extractive industries´ technical complexity is beyond their comprehension. Similar constraints are 
faced by supreme audit institutions which often suffer from limited follow up on their findings by 
weak legislatures and law enforcement agencies, limited access to documentation, financial and 
human resource cuts, and censorship of their reports by public officials.   
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Private sector 
TAIs involving the private sector often centre around multi-stakeholder processes, including EITI. 
Such initiatives are generally seen by private sector stakeholders as having had broadly positive 
effects for the extractives industry, whilst simultaneously posing a number of risks and 
challenges. The work of the International Council on Mining and Metals (ICMM), as an influential 
convenor in the sector, is also viewed as largely positive, especially at the international level and 
among ‘key opinion forming’ institutions. However, with a few exceptions, ICMM´s influence is 
considered to be limited at the national and sub-national levels. 
Key challenges identified with regards to efforts to engage the private sector in accountability 
initiatives, include the fact that many of the most damaging actions in developing countries are 
carried out by small companies which tend to fall outside the purview of multi-stakeholder 
initiatives, the lack of transparency and accountability in state-owned companies and the 
involvement of so-called ‘politically exposed persons’ (PEPs) in the ownership of companies 
involved in natural resource extraction. 
Future research 
Potential areas for future research identified in the literature include: 
▪ investing in understanding the casual linkages between project interventions and actual 
governance outcomes, with due consideration for the importance of timing when 
attempting to observe impacts 
▪ clearly differentiating between outputs, outcomes and impacts in such interventions  
▪ developing more multi-scalar evaluation approaches  
▪ developing a better understanding of the distribution of power in multi-stakeholder 
initiatives, as well as motivational, institutional and structural constraints that directly 
undermine project interventions  
▪ building a better understanding of which kinds of approaches work in differing contexts 
▪ empirically testing the relative importance of sanctions for ensuring effective impact of 
TAIs.  
 Evidence base 
While there is some agreement around what good natural resource governance looks like, there 
remains little understanding of the factors that contribute to such outcomes, and no convincing 
theory of change which explains how such factors might help achieve the desired outcomes 
(Mejia Acosta 2010, Mejia Acosta 2013, Scanteam 2011). In the case of EITI for example, a 
recent evaluation notes that “what is missing is an overall strategic approach based on a theory 
of change with a log frame that can be monitored and which could have been the backbone for 
the evaluating effectiveness and impact of the EITI” (Neumann 2016).  
Instead, most TAIs in the extractive sectors are based on the assumption that making information 
about revenue flows more transparent enables citizens, governments and other stakeholders to 
use the information to hold government to account, and ultimately ensure that revenues are 
channelled to public ends (McGee and Gaventa 2010). Yet, while there is some evidence that 
TAIs in the extractives sector (in particular the EITI – see below) can contribute to greater 
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transparency, the question of whether this leads to more accountability, or to broader 
governance, social and development outcomes remains largely unanswered. Indeed, unpacking 
the assumptions behind this causal chain is increasingly recognised as critical for understanding 
the impact of TAIs more generally (Fox 2014; Joshi 2014; McDevitt 2017). Moving forward, it is 
therefore considered critical to distinguish whether TAIs are conceived as means to achieve a 
further end, or whether transparency is seen as an end in itself. In other words, a clearer 
distinction needs to be made between short term outcomes (transparency), intermediate 
outcomes (e.g. participation and accountability), and long term outcomes (social and 
developmental gains).  
As a result, “impact” tends to be measured in terms of compliance with standards or changes in 
procedures at the organizational or institutional level, rather than broader development or 
governance outcomes. Where broader claims are made, evidence tends to be anecdotal (McGee 
and Gaventa 2010; Mejia Acosta 2010; Mejia Acosta 2013). Furthermore, transparency is often 
regarded as an end in itself, despite the fact that it is now widely recognised that transparency 
needs to be accompanied by measures to encourage uptake and use for accountability purposes 
(McGee and Gaventa 2010).  
Impact is most often assessed through expert interviews with extractive industry stakeholders, to 
provide qualitative insights and identify whether a programme intervention was successful or not. 
However, it is argued, partly because many such evaluations are commissioned by those with 
and interest in demonstrating success, they can suffer from judgement biases (Mejia Acosta 
2010; Rustad et al 2017). In particular, the fact that negative or unexpected lessons are not given 
sufficient attention, leads to “unqualified optimism around the good nature of findings” (Mejia 
Acosta 2010).  
A more systematic evaluation mechanism consists of applying questionnaires to affected 
stakeholders or programme beneficiaries, which is usually more expensive, time consuming and 
challenging because for the need to ensure a representative sample as well as internal 
consistency or continuity of survey respondents over time (Mejia Acosta 2010). 
A fundamental and, as yet, unresolved challenge in assessing impact and effectiveness of TAIs 
in the extractives sector is the question of attribution. It is difficult to identify which are the most 
relevant factors to produce policy change, (e.g civil society activism vs structural or institutional 
factors) and which can be credibly associated with facilitating or blocking effective impact (Mejia 
Acosta 2010; Mejia Acosta 2013). In particular, it is difficult to distinguish the results of specific 
accountability interventions from the results of broader government or corporate processes (e.g. 
laws and regulations, external and internal audits, reporting of stock-exchange listed companies). 
An additional challenge in the case of the case of EITI is to identify attribution vis-a-vis other 
initiatives (e.g. Open Government Partnership, Global Reporting Initiative, Equator Principles), 
which aim to achieve similar outcomes (e.g. informed public debate or anti-corruption) (Neumann 
2016). 
A second constraint for identifying impact is the time lag between a given intervention and 
observed or meaningful change. This problem entails a recognition that existing institutions, 
reforms or individual motivations tend to remain resilient over time or require long term influence 
beyond the scope of project interventions (Mejia Acosta 2010). 
A third challenge relates to the extent to which findings in very different socio-political contexts 
can be compared or extrapolated to arrive at meaningful generalised conclusions. As noted by 
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Shaxson (2009) it is often a mistake to transpose lessons drawn from mineral-dominated states 
and apply them to other types of countries. Mineral resources provide rulers with the potential to 
maintain an unusually tight grip on power, severely curbing the influence of citizens. These 
constraints are often not present in states where minerals are not the primary source of 
economic rents, and where the causal link between transparency and better accountability and 
governance is likely to be entirely different (Shaxon 2009). To this extent, the recent body of work 
which has begun to try and make sense of the contextual factors which favour or hinder 
successful TAIs would seem particularly promising (McDevitt, 2017). 
Effectiveness vs impact 
It is critical to distinguish whether TAIs are conceived as means to achieve a further end (e.g. 
reduced corruption, fairer distribution of wealth, poverty alleviation), or whether transparency is 
seen as an end in itself (Mejia Acosta 2010). With regards to multi-stakeholder initiatives (MSIs), 
it appears that this debate remains largely unresolved. For example, many public sector MSIs 
are still in the process of debating and negotiating definitions of “success.” Some suggest that 
this debate can be partially attributed to a transition from an early phase of MSI operation, where 
getting governments to participate was a high priority, to a newer phase, focused on improving 
performance. However, the ongoing nature of these debates also suggests that “success” 
remains a fluid concept that is under constant (re)negotiation between and within participating 
countries on one hand and with donors on the other (Brockyer et al 2015). 
Nevertheless, two broad approaches to measuring success can be identified in the literature. 
One approach focuses on analysis of the micro mechanisms of impact, such as creating multi-
stakeholder platforms for debate, empowering civil society actors to gain access to information or 
facilitating the lobbying efforts of elected politicians by providing them with improved legislative 
information. Studies adopting this approach tend to be country specific and as such it is doubtful 
that lessons can be transported to different contexts without proper adaptation (Mejia-Acosta 
2010).  
The second approach focuses on the macro level, looking at how the outcomes of TAIs (greater 
CSO participation, improved budget transparency) may be associated with better development or 
social outcomes (lower perception of corruption, improved development indicators), particularly in 
the context of EITI. Brockyer et al (2015) summarise the findings of these “macro” studies, noting 
some promising correlations between EITI and indicators of good governance, development, and 
investor confidence. For example, EITI participation is found to have a statistically significant 
positive relationship with perceptions of business climate, GDP per capita, foreign direct 
investment, as well as measures of voice and accountability, perceptions of the rule of law and 
the capacity of governments to make sound policy, as compared to non-EITI participation. On the 
other hand, there appears to be no significant correlation between EITI and indicators of 
corruption. Indeed, one study noted that EITI countries actually performed worse on the 
Worldwide Governance Indicators´ control of corruption measure in 2007 than they had in 2002 
(Olcer 2009). Although these studies have a strong empirical base, they fail to illustrate the 
causal processes or mechanisms through which change actually takes place, or what are the 
necessary pre-conditions for change to take place (Mejia-Acosta 2010). 
In this sense, Rustad et al (2017) support the view that any evaluation of the EITI needs to be 
clear about which type of objective it is measuring, and that an evaluation should not deem the 
EITI a success or failure based on evaluating only one or two aspects of the initiative. 
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Furthermore, given the expectations associated with EITI broader goals, and the interplay of 
variables independent of the EITI, evaluations which attempt to assess the achievement of 
development and social goals are also the ones most likely to deem the EITI as a failure. Seen 
from an EITI perspective, such evaluations may say little about what EITI can and has achieved 
through its own influence (Rustad et al 2017). 
Instead, Rustad argues, focusing on smaller achievements can better inform analyses of 
collective forms of governance, which rarely follow a linear and predetermined process. 
Evaluations examining what is going on within multi-stakeholder groups, for example, could focus 
on such ‘small wins’ and the processes involved in achieving them, with precise definitions of 
sub-goals for that particular operational goal. Evaluations of more detailed sub-goals might be a 
more constructive way of evaluating the EITI, and yield a more appropriate and accurate 
reflection of the successes and failures of the EITI (Rustad et al 2017).  
Notwithstanding these considerable measurement challenges, the following section of this report 
identifies, to the extent possible, the extent to which TAIs in the extractives sector have been 
considered a success and presents some of the inherent challenges associated with their 
implementation. 
 Multi-stakeholder initiatives and civil society coalitions 
The most prominent multi-stakeholder initiative in the extractives sector is the Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), which aims to strengthen governance by improving 
transparency and accountability through verification and full publication of company payments 
and government revenues from oil, gas and mining. Another important initiative is the Publish 
What You Pay (PWYP) coalition, a global network of civil society organisations calling for an 
open and accountable extractive sector. PWYP’s coalition model is built on the belief that the 
coordinated, collective actions of a diverse coalition of organisations will be most effective in 
influencing key stakeholders and driving policy change towards greater transparency in the 
extractive industries (Batchelor and Hearn 2013). 
Evidence of impact/effectiveness 
EITI 
As of 2016, EITI was being implemented by more than 50 resource-driven countries including 
OECD and non-OECD countries (Neumann, 2016). There have been numerous formal 
evaluations and academic studies of the effectiveness and impact of EITI over the past 10 years. 
The most recent of these (Rustad 2017) finds that the EITI has been most successful in reaching 
its institutional goals, notably by becoming a recognized brand and consolidating transparency as 
a global norm. It has also been fairly successful in reaching some of the operational goals, such 
as setting up standards for auditing, reporting, and civil society involvement in multi-stakeholder 
groups. In line with previous studies, and as discussed above, it also notes that the question of 
whether the EITI has had an impact on developmental goals remains an open question as it is 
challenging to identify the correct measurements for impact and many evaluations assess goals 
that are over-inflated compared to what the initiative formally seeks to achieve (Rustad 2017). 
Another recent study finds that stakeholders experience less impact from EITI in both stable 
democracies and autocracies as compared to those “hybrid” countries in-between (Neumann 
2016). 
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EITI is also considered to have made significant progress in improving the transparency of 
extractive industry payments to national governments, with 35 countries having produced reports 
disclosing payments covering 200 fiscal years and 1.2 trillion US dollars in government revenue 
by 2015. It has generated new spaces for dialogue and negotiation around extractives between 
government and civil society, in many cases for the first time (Brockyer et al 2015). This 
achievement is seen as particularly important in fragile and post-conflict countries1 such as 
Liberia and the Democratic Republic of Congo where multi-stakeholder platforms have brought 
together hostile parties and reduced tensions among them (Liberia), and broadened participation 
from remote areas (Democratic Republic of Congo) (Lehmann 2015). Neumann (2016) further 
suggests that the initial narrow focus on technical aspects of reconciliation of payments has 
helped to build trust and to eventually drive the development of the impact-oriented EITI 
Standard of 2013. As a result, several new and highly relevant topics have since come onto the 
EITI agenda including beneficial ownership, the role of state owned companies, production and 
consumer subsidies, secretive contracts, aggressive transfer pricing, tax incompliance, 
plausibility checks to tackle bad deals, smuggling and fraud (Neumann 2016). 
Some more tangible outcomes have also been attributed to EITI. In Nigeria, for example, the 
Nigerian EITI (NEITI) identified missing payments of almost US$ 10 billion, although only about a 
quarter of that amount has been recovered (Brockyer et al 2015). The NEITI has also led to the 
revision of the 2012 Executive Draft of the Petroleum Industry Bill (Lehmann 2015). In Ghana, 
EITI reports showed that the country was failing to collect as much revenue as it could, leading 
policymakers to make significant royalty and corporate tax reforms. The Democratic Republic of 
Congo, meanwhile, uncovered US$ 88 million in missing revenue, although no funds have been 
recovered, despite a long investigation by the auditor general’s office. Liberia conducted an audit 
of existing oil and mining contracts and found that over 90% of those reviewed did not comply 
with existing laws and regulations (Brockyer et al 2015). As a result Ghana, Liberia, and Nigeria 
have all enshrined their rules for revenue disclosure in national law. However, beyond passing 
laws that mandate future disclosure, there are only a few examples of sustained public debate or 
policy change (Brockyer et al 2015). 
In terms of the sustainability of EITI, outcome areas that are integrated with other initiatives and 
standards or mainstreamed in government and corporate policies are considered to have good 
prospects for longer-term impact. This is because once the Principles of EITI have been 
proliferated and internalized by government and businesses it is likely that they will be 
maintained not least for reputational, political and commercial reasons. However, it cannot be 
ruled out that changes in the political economy of a country may quickly reverse such gains 
(Neumann 2016). 
Publish What You Pay (PWYP) 
A study of the PWYP model (Batchelor and Hearn 2013) suggests that where national coalitions 
have made significant progress in their transparency campaigns, this has been due to the 
adoption of a combination of strategies including: taking advantage of windows of opportunity 
and tipping points, grassroots organisation and public action, building coalitions among policy 
actors, and to a lesser extent through targeted messaging. While significant change has 
                                                 
1 For an overview of the existing evidence on TAIs in fragile and conflict-affected settings, please see the related 
helpdesk report entitled “Transparency and accountability in fragile and conflict-affected settings” (McDevitt,  
2017) 
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generally occurred in moments of turbulence or unexpected change, the slow but systematic 
lobbying of the coalition has created space for activists to prepare for and take advantage of 
such windows of opportunity. PWYP coalitions´ role in mobilising grass-roots support is seen as 
particularly critical, both through direct work with communities and by involving organisations with 
extensive grass-roots support, such as labour unions and faith-based organisations. Building 
coalitions among government, the private sector, and the international community is also an 
important mechanism, and seen as having been a particularly significant factor in recent major 
policy wins in the US and EU, namely the passing of the Dodd-Frank Act2 and the EU 
Transparency Directive, respectively. A key conclusion of the report is that the PWYP campaign 
needs to think long term to ensure sustainability and address emerging campaign priorities 
(revised and fair contracts, transparent and proper use of funds, etc) with a focus on recruiting a 
new generation of champions at the national level (Batchelor and Hearn 2013).  
Challenges 
Despite the largely positive trends observed around these initiatives, the evidence also suggests 
that greater disclosure has yet to lead to tangible accountability reforms or improved efficiency in 
the distribution of national resources (Brockyer et al 2015). It is increasingly recognised that 
publishing reports that remain largely unread by the target audience in some countries does not 
lead to better results and can at a certain point be an impediment to impact and sustainability 
(Neumann 2016). Thus, while transparency has improved as a result of EITI, the same cannot be 
said for accountability. This is partly because the necessary political, legal and institutional 
improvements have in most cases not been put in place, but also because EITI outreach has 
tended to focus on dissemination rather than support for social actors to empower them to apply 
EITI data for increased accountability. (Scanteam 2011).   
Other important shortcoming identified in the literature include: 
▪ Absence of key countries: Although the EITI is directly relevant in 50 plus countries and 
thus implemented by the majority of resource-driven countries around the world, there 
continues to be a notable absence of EITI adoption amongst the BRICS and the largest 
oil producers globally (Neumann 2016). 
▪ Lack of attention to scale: While the EITI has focussed on the national level, there has 
been little attention given to impact at the local level, on the one hand, and little focus on 
international flows, on the other. For example, intra-company trade between subsidiaries 
allows for transfer pricing (or mispricing) below the market value, with the untaxed 
surplus then sheltered in tax havens. Yet the EITI, while aiming to be a global framework, 
does not address such transboundary flows (Lehmann 2015). 
▪ Limited sanctioning power: While there are basic accountability mechanisms provided 
through the oversight of multi-stakeholder groups at the national level, enforcement 
through sanctions is not formally considered in EITI. When discrepancies are reported, 
for example, it is up to the regulatory agencies to resolve differences. (Olcer 2009). 
Moreover, EITI only includes sanctions for countries, which can de-listed if found to be 
                                                 
2 It should be noted that recent US policy decisions have since threatened to weaken the Frank Dodd Act 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/antoinegara/2017/02/03/with-a-stroke-of-the-pen-donald-trump-will-wave-
goodbye-to-the-dodd-frank-act/#72ba49361148  
10 
non-compliant. Such compulsory measures do not exist for companies whose 
cooperation remains voluntary.  
▪ Loss of interest: One study of EITI in Liberia and Timor-Leste (cited in Brockyer et al 
2015) found that found that while EITI generated a great deal of initial public interest, the 
national multi-stakeholder groups in both countries lost momentum shortly after 
completing the validation process. The study suggests that the loss of momentum can be 
attributed to a combination of turnover among key participants and the highly technical 
nature of the information being disclosed rendering it irrelevant to public debate. Likewise 
in Azerbaijan, the first country to be EITI compliant, the government lost interest in the 
initiative as soon as the validation process was complete. Even in Nigeria, where the EITI 
reports are considered a “gold standard,” they have produced limited benefits, due to a 
lack of political will to follow up on their findings (Brockyer et al 2015). This, it is 
suggested is a common trend among EITI participating countries, whereby many national 
multi-stakeholder groups struggle to expand enthusiasm for their work beyond a few key 
participants, leaving the work especially vulnerable to the election cycle and other 
personnel shifts (Brockyer et al 2015). 
▪ Unintended consequences: It has been suggested that EITI implementation at the 
national level can run the risk of empowering elite groups, technocrats and policymakers 
with new information, rather than broader public stakeholders. The audience that has 
made most meaningful use of the EITI reports in Nigeria, for example, are mostly located 
within elite circles and in government. These circles include the National Assembly, 
various ministries, advisers, and policy-makers. It is believed the reports may also have 
been particularly beneficial to oil industry consultants (Shaxson 2009). 
In addition to these shortcomings, the expectations placed on civil society in EITI in particular, 
and other TAIs generally, is considered to present a significant challenge. Civil society is 
expected to put pressure on governments to join EITI, to have the capacity to scrutinise the 
figures presented in the EITI reports, and to understand the financial intricacies of the extractives 
sector, associated government regulators and state budgeting practices (Olcer 2009). 
 
Yet in many countries, the space for civil society to participate in public governance is still 
seriously contrained (Brockyer et al 2015). According to one study (Mainhardt-Gibbs 2010), nine 
out of twelve responding countries indicated that CSOs have no or limited ability to follow up on 
EITI report recommendations, and often CSOs have to apply through the government to get 
access to World Bank funds intended for CSO EITI capacity building. Indeed, in many cases, 
CSO participation tightly controlled by government, since government officials often appoint the 
stakeholder groups rather than allowing self-selection by civil society. In other countries, civil 
society representatives were invited to stakeholder meetings too late to be able to affect the 
agenda of those meetings (Olcer 2009). This latter point is significant given that in most cases, 
CSO engagement in the EITI process tends to be in the early stages of implementation 
(Mainhardt-Gibbs 2010). 
There are also concerns surrounding stakeholder group selection process and unclear or 
inadequate roles and responsibilities of CSOs within the EITI process (Mainhardt-Gibbs 2010). 
As a result, the relevance of multi-stakeholder activities and outputs in general, and EITI 
specifically, to existing domestic civil society priorities has been brought into question, as has the 
ability of CSOs to adequately comprehend and disseminate the information being disclosed. 
(Brockyer et al 2015).  
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Darby (2015) identifies a number of additional challenges related to support to civil society in 
extractive-focussed TAIs. Firstly, many civil society groups are typically focused on either 
economic governance or natural resource management, but rarely both. There is also often 
tension between the two kinds of groups. Any capacity building in this area, he argues, should 
therefore try to narrow the gap between the two approaches and identify complementarities 
between the economic governance and environmental governance approaches and groups.  
A further challenge identified by Darby (2010) is the tendency amongst donors to provide funding 
only for very specific, time-limited projects. This means that CSOs are all too often forced to meet 
core funding costs by skimming funds from projects that are focused on other areas, leading 
some CSOs to be opaque in the way they use funds. The short-term nature of many CSO 
funding models can also force CSOs to focus their efforts on high-profile, event-based advocacy, 
rather than building long-term capacity and focusing on developing analytical strength. This in 
turn allows governments and companies to paint CSOs as sensationalist and unqualified to 
engage in serious debate in the sector. In this sense, there is much to be said for donor support 
to be focus not only on CSO capacity-building but also on supporting the creation of legitimate 
space for CSOs to be involved in shaping government and corporate policy (Darby 2010). 
 Media and investigative journalism 
As the volume of publically available data on extractive industries continues to grow, the role of 
the media and in particular investigative journalism in making sense of this wealth of information 
is increasingly recognised as key component of the evolving transparency and accountability 
agenda. Indeed, reporting on a pilot programme to strengthen oversight of the extractive sector 
in Ghana and Tanzania, Mejia Acosta (2009) notes that media organizations in the two countries 
are reported to be much more capable of effectively influencing policy debates to promote more 
transparent contracting, fairer distribution and improved allocation of natural resource revenues 
than other stakeholders like CSOs or MPs. Yet support for investigative journalism has been 
identified as a major gap in international media assistance, marked by funding that is largely 
episodic and that makes up but a small fraction of that spent on overall media development 
(estimated at about 2 percent of global media development funding by major donors) (Kaplan 
2013).  
Evidence of impact/effectiveness 
Because of its emphasis on longer-term, high-impact journalism, investigative reporting projects 
can be difficult to evaluate. Nevertheless, it has been suggested that projects aimed at creating a 
culture of investigative journalism should be evaluated based on their quality and impact, rather 
than on the numbers of people trained and stories produced (Kaplan 2013).  One study of 
journalism training in the context of extractive industries in Nigeria, Ghana and Uganda, notes 
that across all three countries, journalists had an overwhelmingly positive view of training 
programmes. Journalists said that training significantly improved their writing. Solving the skills 
deficit in their reporting made it easier for journalists to address the other challenges to their 
work. However, the study goes on to caution that training does not always lead to better 
journalism, principally because it only addresses one challenge (a lack of skills) of the many 
facing journalists in these countries (Colemry et al 2009). Moreover, according to one 
commentator interviewed as part of the research for this helpdesk report, a recent evaluation of 
NRGI´s support to media covering the extractives industries revealed that training to individual 
journalists improved the quality and quantity of extractives related reporting, but that the 
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individual trained journalist often did not transmit that learning throughout their media houses to 
scale the quality and quantity of coverage at the media house. She also emphasised the need to 
go beyond supporting journalists´ capacity to understand technical information, and to focus also 
on enabling them to make this information accessible, which is important for increasing the 
potential for the stories to influence changes in attitudes and perspectives (interview with 
Rebecca Iwerks, NRGI, 5 April 2017). 
A recent paper documents some anecdotal evidence of the media´s impact on resource 
governance (Schiffrin and Rodrigues 2014). In Mozambique, press coverage of protests against 
resettlements of farming communities in the mining areas helped spur government to issue new 
legislation on resettlements, and eventually to join EITI. In Uganda in June 2013, the government 
disclosed information contained in oil contracts, purportedly due to the pressure also from 
various civil society organizations and the non-state-owned media. Nonetheless, civil society 
groups still argued that only limited information on petroleum royalty rates had been released and 
that it was not enough. The incarceration of the Angolan investigative journalist Rafael Marques 
in 1999 eventually led to positive changes to Angola’s Press Law after a long process which 
included lobbying from international organizations concerned with press freedom. In the case of 
the controversy over a planned bauxite mine in Vietnam in 2007, meanwhile, well-placed 
bloggers forced an unprecedented level of transparency in a country with a notoriously closed 
media system (Schiffrin and Rodrigues 2014).  
 
The paper also suggests that the opening up of contracts (available on sites like documentcloud) 
has already led national governments to negotiate far better deals. By seeing what kinds of 
environmental protections countries are negotiating, other governments learn what to ask for and 
are getting better at renegotiating opportunities. It also notes that  ‘Data Literacy Bootcamps’ in 
countries such as Ghana are supporting existing local tech communities interested in data. In 
Ghana, there is now a growing chorus of voices calling for greater government transparency, 
including release of data through the Ghana Open Data Initiative, particularly concerning 
government-mandated royalty payments for communities, arising from extractives sales (Schiffrin 
and Rodrigues 2014).   
 
According to Schiffrin and Rodrigues (2014) a further mechanism through which impact can be 
achieved is through the mutual “amplification” of bloggers and traditional media. Such impact is 
more likely when there are other pressures present at the same time, including political 
transitions, internal political conflicts and external pressure. The paper therefore calls for the 
international donor community to leverage technical and financial resources for improved 
coordination and complementarity, to achieve more meaningful and lasting impact (Schiffrin and 
Rodrigues 2014). The sentiment is echoed by Kaplan (2013), who argues that funding will be 
most effective if it is long term and integrated into broader initiatives that include legal reform and 
freedom of information. Better coordination and communication are needed between those in 
government- funded programs and the investigative journalism community. NGOs would benefit 
by drawing expertise whenever possible from the ranks of professionals. New and larger sources 
of funding need to be found, and new models need to be explored to sustain the expansion of 
investigative non-profits. More practical, story-based training is needed, tailored to a country’s 
needs and capacity, and mentoring local investigative editors should be a priority. The media 
development community also needs to bridge the gap between professional investigative 
journalists and the development world. Ways should be found to tap the expertise of the small 
supply of proven investigative editors in the Western media, who are generally wary of 
development NGOs and governmental donors (Kaplan 2013). 
13 
Challenges 
In their study of journalism training and the extractive industries in Nigeria, Ghana and Uganda, 
Colmery et al (2009) identify the key obstacles to effective investigative journalism as: poor pay, 
access to information from both government and business sources, pressure from government or 
business, bribery of journalists, lack of technology, and lack of skills. These findings are 
supported by Schiffrin and Rodrigues (2014), who identify the following key challenges in the 
sector: 
▪ lack of resources to spend on developing experienced “beat” reporters who can cover a 
subject in depth 
▪ lack of funding for travel and access to remote areas where extraction often takes place  
▪ Complexity of reporting on a sector which includes a range of companies and players 
with different kinds of tax regimes, labour conditions, and environmental and contractual 
agreements 
▪ The power of rich and well connected oil, gas and mining companies who are able to 
shape and control the character of the stories that appear about them, and put pressure 
on journalists through smear campaigns, threats to withdraw advertising and costly and 
drawn-out lawsuits.   
▪ The asymmetry of information in the extractives sector: Powerful actors hold on to 
information and so tracking and monitoring of oil revenues and government/corporate 
expenditure can be difficult. When data is shared, it is often incomplete, inconsistent, 
difficult to interpret or simply wrong. Different institutions or countries publish different 
things at different times and in different ways. Often, this is not an accident:  the intent is 
to limit access of information that might shed light on what companies are doing or the 
terms at which they have been able to obtain the resources. 
▪ Technology has opened many doors for journalists and helps overcome several 
traditional obstacles to reporting, but has also made it easier for governments and others 
opposed to their investigations and interested in their silence to have access to their 
identities and monitor their activities. 
 Legislatures and audit institutions 
While efforts to increase transparency and accountability in the management of natural 
resources emphasize the roles and responsibilities of a broad range of actors, relatively little 
attention has been paid to the potential contribution of horizontal accountability mechanisms, in 
particular the role of elected legislators (NDI 2007). As a result, evidence of impact in this area is 
little more than anecdotal. 
Evidence of impact/effectiveness 
In theory, legislators can support the governance of extractive industries in a number of ways, 
including by: securing the public disclosure of extraction contracts; assessing and monitoring 
compliance with contracts and laws; amending and ratifying legislation on extractive sector 
management; scrutinizing revenue projections; monitoring the performance of government 
agencies responsible for managing the extractive sector; reviewing information and data on 
extractives made available in EITI reports; building consensus within and across political parties 
on extractives governance across political cycles; and informing and managing expectations of 
constituents and representing constituents’ interests (NRGI nd). 
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Extractive industry committees are seen as a particularly effective way for legislators to organize 
and coordinate their involvement in the extractive industries sector. In some cases, coordination 
between existing committees whose mandates cover various aspects of the extractives sector 
(e.g. budget, oil or mining, anti-corruption, lands, public accounts) can be useful. The legislature 
can also establish ad-hoc, select or investigative committees to investigate specific issues. 
Effective oversight throughout the whole extractive industries sector requires that the activities of 
these committees be coordinated and that information be shared between them. Committees 
need to have clear mandates, roles and responsibilities as well as skilled members and support 
staff with access to relevant and accurate analysis and information (WBI 2010). 
A study of the role of legislatures in extractive industries in Africa cites a number of examples of 
legislative impact. The legislatures of Nigeria, Sao Tome and Principe, and South Africa have 
passed legislation intended to ensure the sustainable and accountable management of their 
countries’ natural resources. Legislatures in several countries, including Ghana, Nigeria and 
South Africa, regularly request access to information in order to conduct oversight and 
investigatory activities, and are increasingly holding public hearings on proposed legislation. 
Lawmakers from Nigeria, Chad and the Democratic Republic of Congo participate in working 
groups, commissions and other bodies designed to improve sector management. The 
legislatures in a number of African countries are also strengthening committee systems, research 
and analysis capacity, and rules of procedures. South Africa’s National Assembly Research Unit, 
for example, produces briefs for use in reviewing executive branch budget proposals. Nigeria’s 
National Assembly, meanwhile, has established a budget and research office to improve its 
ability to engage the executive more substantively on budget and public expenditure issues. (NDI 
2007) 
In terms of more specific actions undertaken by legislatures, Tanzania’s Public Accounts 
Committee (PAC) ordered the arrest of the acting Director General and the Chairman of the 
Tanzania Petroleum Development Cooperation (TPDC) in November 2014 on charges of failing 
to release oil and gas contracts to parliament. The PAC successfully obtained the documents for 
independent verification of the contractual terms and to determine whether the government had 
reached a good deal on behalf of its citizens. In Kyrgyzstan, the parliament voted in February 
2013 to renegotiate a contract signed in 2009 with a Canadian company for the exploitation of an 
important gold mine, and subsequently created a joint venture with its Canadian owner (NDI 
2007). More recently, the Liberian parliament formally legislated annual EITI reporting and 
included two MPs in the EITI multi-stakeholder group, enabling easier access to regular and 
reliable information to monitor compliance by government and extractive companies (NRGI nd). 
Challenges 
Notwithstanding the important role that legislatures can play with regards to extractive 
management, effective oversight and rule-making is often hampered by a range of contextual 
factors. Mejia Acosta (2009) summarises these constraints as: (a) individual and often conflicting 
motivations of legislators (b) parliament-specific constrains, including political and legal 
constraints, and (c) institutional-structural constraints such as the policy making predominance of 
the executive in the policy process and the weak oversight capability of specialized agencies 
(Mejia Acosta 2009).  
One common problem in new democracies in particular is that by the time democratic institutions 
develop, vested interests may already have taken root, making it more difficult for well-meaning 
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legislators to ensure transparency and accountability. Similarly, the window of opportunity for 
legislators to prove themselves is often very small in countries where legislatures have limited 
credibility in the eyes of citizens (NDI 2007).  
The potential effectiveness of impact of legislators is also often constrained by the formal powers 
granted to parliaments via constitutions and the legislature’s standing orders. Some systems 
allow members to introduce legislation and some permit committees to introduce legislation, and 
some parliaments have formal authority to override a presidential veto. Other aspects of a 
legislature’s formal powers are the time allotted to consider legislation and the right of executives 
to rule by decree during periods of national emergency and, in some cases, when the legislature 
is not in session (WBI 2010). 
 
The willingness of the executive and other political actors such as political parties to share 
information with parliament can also affect it’s ability to meaningfully discharge its lawmaking 
function (WBI 2010). In many resource-rich countries, legislatures have little de facto 
independence from more powerful executives and ruling political parties often act to rubber 
stamp executive policy after little or no debate. This is often exacerbated by a culture of secrecy 
over extractive industry activities which leads to limited public, as well as legislative, access to 
information on the oil and mining sectors (NDI 2007).  
 
Finally, many parliaments are unable to execute the full extent of their formal powers due to 
limited resources in the form of facilities, money, professional staff, a lack of services available to 
parliament through independent budget, research, policy, and legal analysis offices, and in some 
cases a lack of clarity about the role and responsibility of a legislator or committee member. As a 
result, parliamentarians are often not able to perform provide well informed input into legislation, 
regulations, and policies (WBI 2010). Furthermore, a common perception held by many 
legislators themselves is that the extractive industries´ technical complexity is beyond their 
comprehension. Faced with proposals from well-informed or connected executive branch 
agencies or officials, legislators often lack both the information and the confidence to influence 
legislation, policy or management of the extractive industries (NDI 2007).  
 
Similar constraints are faced by Supreme Audit Institutions (SAIs) who, along with 
parliaments, have a critical role to play in overseeing the extractives sector. SAIs are increasingly 
conducting audits along the entire extractives decision chain, from auditing compliance with 
extractives legislation and contract allocation processes, to assessing State-owned Enterprise 
operations and environmental impacts. Performance audits have also become a popular way to 
scrutinize resource governance policies.  
However, because SAIs typically rely on parliament and law enforcement to follow up on their 
findings, their potential impact is dependent on the effectiveness and independence of these 
institutions. In some countries, reports exposing serious mismanagement and inefficiencies in the 
extractive sector are produced year after year with little action taken. Furthermore, SAIs are 
sometimes systematically weakened and restricted by officials with interests in keeping resource 
management opaque. Such tactics include limiting access to documentation, cutting financial and 
human resources, and censoring reports. Even when can have the necessary technical 
expertise, sufficient resources, a comprehensive legal mandate, and a strong auditor general 
ready to speak out, if the head of government does not acknowledge and support the critical role 
of the SAI, impact will likely be limited. (Wilkins 2016). 
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 Private sector 
Evidence of impact/effectiveness 
TAIs involving the private sector often centre around multi-stakeholder processes, including EITI. 
From the perspective of the private sector, EITI is widely seen as having had broadly positive 
effects for the extractives industry. Positive impacts identified include improvement in the 
governance of natural resources (although some see the impact as small), building trust, 
reducing scope for corruption, facilitating dialogue in a sector where relationships are prone to 
conflict, and a growing understanding of the contribution that extractive companies make to host 
country economies (Bickham 2015).  
Nevertheless, private actors also perceive a number of potential risks for the industry arising from 
EITI including manipulation by campaigners for higher taxes or contract renegotiation, increased 
costs and bureaucracy arising from national processes, the disclosure of commercially sensitive 
information, the dangers of overloading national processes, the danger that EITI loses its focus 
on revenue-related issues in favour of becoming a ‘catch-all’ process, and the limited outreach 
and support given to the private sector, compared with civil society especially around the new 
2013 Standard (Bickham 2015). This perspective is to some extent echoed by Darby (2010), who 
notes that private sector focussed governance programmes tend to focus on increasing 
regulation and changing company behaviour, while largely negelcting the issue of capacity 
building for those companies.  
Beyond EITI, Mejia Acosta (2013), cites the example of the International Council on Mining and 
Metals (ICMM) as an influential private sector association seeking to  improve the governance of 
natural resources through the development of standards and reputational sanctions and the 
promotion of greater transparency of mineral revenues. A key strength of the ICMM´s approach 
is considered to be the fact that sanctions for non-compliance are explicitly stated and enforced 
through a rigorous review process that takes into account business information and compliance 
with established ICMM standards (Mejia Acosta 2013).  
A recent evaluation of the ICMM´s flagship “Mining: Partnerships for Development Toolkit”3, 
which aims to quantify and reach consensus on ways to enhance mining's economic and social 
contribution at the national level, notes that despite limited evidence of tangible development 
contributions, there is some evidence of favourable outcomes in terms of driving internal 
company standards, plans and practices, as well as through the generation of high-quality data 
that has enabled industry to engage in high-level policy discussions. The evaluation also finds 
ICMM’s influence is strongest at the international level and among ‘key opinion forming’ 
institutions such as the World Bank, UNCTAD and WEF. However, with a few exceptions, this 
influence is limited at the national and sub-national levels (CSRM 2014). 
Challenges 
According to Darby (2010), a key challenge with regards to efforts to engage the private sector in 
accountability initiatives is that many of the most damaging actions in developing countries 
(either deliberate or due to limited understanding of sustainability issues) are carried out by 
                                                 
3 At the time of the evaluation the toolkit had been applied in Chile, Peru, Ghana, Tanzania, Lao PDR and Brazil, 
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companies that are relatively small. Such companies tend to have operations only in one or two 
countries, are sometimes privately owned, often have no headquarters presence in developed 
countries, and almost never have a retail presence (Darby 2010). This points to a clear gap in 
what Darby (2010) calls the transparency and accountability ‘marketplace’ for the development of 
simplified methods to implement sustainable governance standards for those small to medium 
companies that are willing but lack resources. 
The lack of transparency and accountability in state-owned companies involved in resource 
extraction is another often overlooked issue. This is seen as particularly problematic in the oil 
and gas sector, where the vast majority of global production is carried out by state-owned 
companies, and where several such companies are increasingly prominent in developing oil and 
gas prospects outside of their home countries (Darby 2010).  
 
Another issue is the involvement of so-called ‘politically exposed persons’ (PEPs) in the 
ownership of companies involved in natural resource extraction. While a number of national and 
international legal instruments (e.g. UNCAC, FCPA) prevent companies from being involved in 
investments and developments with companies owned or partially owned by PEPs, the challenge 
lies in identifying the actual ownership of companies, as a company may be owned by a series of 
other companies and trusts, often spread across multiple jurisdictions, which makes their 
controlling interests visible only at several steps removed (Darby 2010). In this sense, the fact 
that both beneficial ownership transparency and the role and behaviour of state owned 
companies are increasingly finding their way onto the EITI agenda can be considered a positive 
step (Neumann 2016). 
 Possible areas for future research 
In order to strengthen the evidence base on the impact of TAIs in the extractives sector, a 
number of commentators have suggested promising areas for future research. While the 
suggestions below are by no means comprehensive, they offer an indication of the most pressing 
research gaps identified to date. 
▪ Greater effort needs to be invested in determining casual linkages between project 
interventions on extractives and actual governance outcomes, in particular in terms of 
how transparency is taken up to achieve broader goals (Mejia-Acosta 2010; McGee and 
Gaventa 2010). This requires more reliable, up to date and user friendly datasets that 
allow a better assessment of project interventions through a  mix of quantitative and 
qualitative methods. The validity or reliability of empirical data needs to be complemented 
with in depth interviews to understand the causal processes, and contextual drivers, 
underlying impact. Conversely, empirical observations can be a useful way to correct or 
adjust any biases coming from the selection of different stakeholders.  (Mejia Acosta 
2010). 
▪ There is a need for greater articulation of  “effectiveness” and “impact” are defined and 
measured in Multi-Stakeholder Initiatives to avoid confusion between outputs, outcomes 
and impacts (Brockyer et al 2015). 
▪ There is a need for more multi-scalar evaluation approaches, most notably by comparing 
and consolidating the wealth of evidence collected at the level of individual countries and 
building a testable theory of change both for developmental goals and for ‘small wins’ to 
more systematically evaluate what works and what does not in specific contexts. Such 
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further research will help to identify the specific mechanisms through which successes 
have been attained and what factors have contributed to failures (Rustad et al 2017). 
▪ There is a need for MSIs to better understand and influence the distribution of power in 
participating countries. Exploring these areas in more detail should provide MSIs with 
more political levers to effect real change (Brockyer et al 2015) 
▪ From an evaluation standpoint, greater effort needs to be done to document motivational, 
institutional and structural constraints that directly undermine project interventions (Mejia 
Acosta 2010).  
▪ More consideration needs to be given to the importance of timing when attempting to 
observe impacts. This is considered to be particularly relevant in parliamentary arenas for 
example, where the process for introduction, discussion and adoption of new legislation 
can be quite unpredictable (Mejia Acosta 2010).  
▪ There is a need to empirically verify the relative importance of sanctions for ensuring 
effective impact of TAIs, with a view to developing the most appropriate set of institutional 
and reputational sanctions that make non-compliance more costly for governments 
(Mejia Acosta 2010).  
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